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Abstract—The autonomous car technology promises to re-
place human drivers with safer driving systems. But although
autonomous cars can become safer than human drivers this
is a long process that is going to be refined over time. Before
these vehicles are deployed on urban roads a minimum safety
level must be assured. Since the autonomous car technology
is still under development there is no standard methodology to
evaluate such systems. It is important to completely understand
the technology that is being developed to design efficient means
to evaluate it. In this paper we assume safety-critical systems
reliability as a safety measure. We model an autonomous road
vehicle as an intelligent agent and we approach its evaluation
from an artificial intelligence perspective. Our focus is the
evaluation of perception and decision making systems and also
to propose a systematic method to evaluate their integration in
the vehicle. We identify critical aspects of the data dependency
from the artificial intelligence state of the art models and we
also propose procedures to reproduce them.
I. INTRODUCTION
To ensure quality and safety the automotive industry thor-
oughly tests motor vehicles. This is a usual procedure carried
by all major manufacturers. Most tests focus on physical
attacks to evaluate equipment durability, electrical and radio
frequency emission and immunity. These tests are defined
in international standards and company procedures. With the
advent of new technologies to automate motor vehicles these
tests must also consider higher level functionalities. The
automation technology aims to replace human drivers and
therefore tests that contemplate machine intelligence must be
required. Given its importance this technology should also be
considered a safety-critical system.
The ultimate goal of autonomous road vehicles is to
provide a safe and reliable transportation. But safety is a
subjective concept that is hard to assess numerically and
systematically [1]. One way to assess it is through events
that demonstrates the lack of safety like the rate of crashes,
injuries and deaths per traveled distance. The biggest problem
of these metrics is that they can only be assessed after
deploying vehicles in urban roads as an after action review.
And deploying vehicles on urban roads for a late safety
assessment is irresponsible.
An informal metric that is being used by car manufacturers
is the “disengagement rate” which is the number of times a
driver must regain control over the vehicle. This “metric” is
extremely vague because a disengagement can be triggered
by any event at any time. It is also expected that a fully
automated vehicle never disengage and the fact that a vehicle
does not disengage does not mean it is safe.
In the machine learning context Varshney [2] defines safety
as the minimization of risk and uncertainty of harmful events.
He also presents some strategies for achieving safety but does
not mention evaluation methods. According to this definition
safety is a state of local minimum risk. Although it seems
a good idea, it might be inappropriate to always drive at
the minimum risk state. Taking risks is part of the driving
experience and there is a compromise among different driving
aspects like safety, speed and comfort. An evaluation method
should certify harmful events never happen independently of
the vehicle safety level.
From a research perspective most autonomous cars evalua-
tion methodologies use base models to assess performance on
specific tasks [3], [4]. Although this evaluation is interesting
for development it is biased towards the base model and do
not present a fair evaluation between acceptable solutions. We
assess safety by evaluating safety-critical system performance
on driving tasks described through percept sequences. Where
the base model is replaced by environment constraints that
must be respected during the task execution.
Although reliability and safety are different concepts they
are directly correlated. If a vehicle safety-critical system fails
there will be a great risk of death or serious injury to people.
Therefore autonomous vehicles must guarantee safety-critical
system faults are as low as reasonably practicable.
We focus is the evaluation of the intelligent agent designed
to automate road vehicles, comprising the perception and
decision-making systems, which are the core problem for
autonomous road vehicles [5]. We also model the problem
to propose a systematic approach for a thorough evaluation
of the system integration. The proposed intelligent agent
evaluation can be made for different groups of sensors
and tasks (automation level) and it is independent of the
model/algorithm implementation.
II. RELATED WORK
Given the importance of the subject there are few papers
that assess autonomous driving systems performance. Numer-
ically evaluate such systems is a hard task because it involves
unknown variables, a relative definition of the best behavior
and also a clear division of right and wrong decisions. For
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instance, some machine learning methods usually presented
in perception systems are still considered black boxes [6],
[7]. The local culture background is an important aspect to
be considered when defining what is the best solution for a
problem [8]. Also, there are moral problems for autonomous
road vehicles that may never have a right answer, problems
like ethical or moral dilemmas [9], [10], [11].
The international standard ISO 26262 aims the functional
safety in road vehicles and provides guidelines for the vehicle
life cycle. It presents instructions for hazard analysis and
risk assessment but it does not define how to identify and
deal with hazardous situations. It does not present evaluation
guidelines and, for being too generic, it leaves space for
subjective and discretion decisions. Also given its release
date, 2011, it does not consider the current developments in
Artificial Intelligence (AI) that are being applied in Advanced
Driver Assistance Systems and Autonomous Driving. This
standard was used by Johansson et al. [12] to identify safety
requirements for environment perception and it was also used
by Khastgir et al. [13] to rate motor vehicles hazardous
situations in real-time.
In [14], Khastgir et al. addresses the lack of a standardized
process to validate intelligent automotive systems. It also
compares existing methods and presents a driving simulator
as a test platform but it does not develop testing method-
ologies and it does not address real data problems from
perception systems.
Huang et al. [15] presents a review of methods that can be
used to test individual subsystems and their integration. To
test algorithms, a common approach is based in individual
task performance assessment where the execution of each
task is compared to a correct model.
Most papers in the area focus in a developer point of
view of testing. They specify an exact behavior that must
be followed and then measure how much proposed solutions
deviates from it [3], [4]. Although this is interesting for
developers the “correct” behavior model is subjective and
produce biased assessments. These models may also be
private data protected by the intellectual property of vehicle
manufacturers. For an evaluation point of view this approach
is too much restrictive. There are two main concerns re-
garding this method. First, it might be impractical to create
a model for every single possible situation; and second,
one situation may have several correct actions (and no best
action). For instance if a frontal obstacle suddenly stops,
changing lanes or also stopping are both acceptable actions.
Computer simulation is becoming the main platform to
test and validate autonomous road vehicles [1], [15], [16].
There are several reasons to support this decision but the
perception system evaluation is far from ideal. Urban roads
are extremely rich and dynamic environments and due to the
generalization error a perception system evaluation cannot
be trusted if the testing examples do not represent the actual
vehicle deployment region. In general a simulator must create
realistic environments and sensors models but there is no
metric to evaluate how realistic they are.
Fig. 1. The usual car model is controlled by a human that is responsible to
perceive the surroundings and make decisions.
Fig. 2. An autonomous car is able to perceive the world. The human can
still take control of the car but it must be able to work without human
intervention.
III. EVALUATION MODEL
Lets consider the Fig. 1 a simplified version of the current
car technology. In this model the human driver is the only
responsible to perceive the surroundings. Also, the driver
is responsible to make decisions and to control the vehicle
accordingly.
The automation technology that is being developed aims to
replace the human driver. Therefore the vehicle must perform
to some extent the perception and decision-making tasks
that were the driver responsibility. A general view of these
interactions is depicted at Fig. 2.
The main difference between these models is that the
autonomous car must perceive its environment and make de-
cisions. From this top-down view it is a simple modification
but it is a hard task to accomplish.
The Generic Autonomous Vehicle System Architecture
divide an autonomous car software in three main layers:
perception, decision-making and action [15]. This general
division is interesting for assessment solutions because it
does not impose technological prerequisites.
Since the action layer is developed according to the con-
trol engineering theory which is an established theory with
decades of use we focus our analysis in the perception and
decision-making layers.
A. Perception
In the perception task, to replace the human sight an
autonomous vehicle makes uses of several sensors. The
most common sensors are video cameras, radar, LIDAR and
ultrasonic sensors. However the raw data from most sensors
do not present the meaningful information required by a
decision-making system. In this work the perception system
comprises the software required to transform raw sensor
data in the meaningful information required by the decision-
making system.
Initial researches on autonomous cars date from the 80s
[17], [18], but only recently that they are becoming a re-
ality. Computational power and the perception system were
great problems for autonomous cars, limiting the automation.
Extracting meaningful data from the sensors was a real chal-
lenge that could only be overcome by recent advancements
in artificial intelligence [19].
It is possible to separate tests in two groups: code imple-
mentation and model/algorithm. There are several software
engineering techniques to test code implementation, usual
examples are unit tests and integration tests. In the machine
learning community the usual way to evaluate models and
algorithms are through datasets. Although datasets are inde-
pendent of the model implementation, datasets are task spe-
cific (classification, segmentation, detection) that are subtasks
of a complete perception system.
Recent papers present evidences that machine learning
models do not have a task optimality [20], [21], [22]. In other
words a specific model may present different performances
on different datasets describing the same task. A model that
has a good performance classifying dogs and cats may have
a bad performance classifying cars and pedestrians.
This data dependence was previously presented in different
ways. A common problem is the generalization error which
measures the ability of a supervised learning model detect
patterns not presented in the training set. The data imbalance
is also a common problem that hinders model training,
inducing the model to neglect rare patterns. Therefore a
dataset evaluation is not only task dependent but also data
dependent.
The generalization error is usually estimated as the dif-
ference between the training and testing sets accuracy. This
estimate is very poor once it depends on the available data.
In other words, it is not possible to assess how a model
will perceive an example that was not present in the dataset.
This aspect brings concerning issues when using datasets.
As a general rule of thumb a dataset must exactly repre-
sent the patterns intended to be found, including different
weather conditions. Since different cities present different
landscapes, urban architecture, car designs, people clothes,
different animals... For the autonomous vehicles context the
safer approach is creating a dataset for each region these
vehicles are intended to be deployed.
Although datasets evaluate the generalization error (to
a certain degree) and also the class imbalance, there are
other problems that arise with the current model-task-data
evaluation with datasets.
1) They focus on subtasks of a bigger problem.
2) The generalization error estimate strongly depends on
available data.
3) Training and testing sets are equally balanced.
4) Testing examples have a high quality.
5) Testing examples are always reliable.
6) Testing examples are always available.
In the autonomous vehicles context these data issues have
been overlooked. In this work we try to enlighten this
problem pointing out specific issues that may arise during the
data acquisition, processing and transmission to perception
modules. We also propose a more realistic evaluation of
autonomous driving perception systems based in percept
sequences.
B. Decision-making
The decision-making process is studied in several fields
of the human knowledge including psychology, mathematics
and artificial intelligence. Since we approach the problem
from an AI perspective we can model the decision-making
system according to the decision theory which combines
probabilities with preferences expressed by utilities [23]. The
decision theory studies the reasoning underlying an agent’s
choices. The probability function describes the chances to
change states through actions and the utility function numer-
ically define state preferences.
An agent state is determined by the set of information it
gathers about the environment through its sensors. A state
may be considered a condition where the agent finds itself.
The agent actions are able to change its state but these
actions are only executed if they are expected to improve the
agent’s condition over time. A utility function defines which
conditions are considered good or bad, describing prefer-
ences over conditions. Preferences are fundamentally relative
between individuals or social groups and incorporate moral
principles/social norms. Therefore, the decisions are based in
preferences that are influenced by a cultural background [8].
It is also interesting to note that some studies point out the
humans do not usually make rational decisions and are “pre-
dictably irrational” [23]. Irrational decisions on urban roads
are easily spotted on everyday traffic. Human preferences
towards some irrational decisions may lead to future conflicts
with intelligent vehicles.
The utility function is very flexible and can contemplate
many different aspects of the driving experience as comfort,
safety and speed. In case safety is a variable there must be an
approach to define the risk of each possible state the vehicle
can assume, similar as presented by Khastgir et al. [13].
Many different utility functions may be defined and all of
them may be considered safe and reliable. However when
a utility function is defined it specifies a behavior that can
be used as a base model. Enforcing a base model as the
right behavior prevents modification in the utility function
and does not give space for adjustments, innovations or
improvements.
It is a common sense that decision-making systems must
follow moral principles [24], [25], [26]. But how to make
rational decisions that are against moral principles? Given
the condition an autonomous car needs to kill a pedestrian
or the vehicle passenger, if a human life is invaluable which
one should die? In this case not choosing is also a decision
that will kill the pedestrian. Should it kill the pedestrian
that has nothing to do with the vehicle previous actions or
should it kill the passenger that bought an autonomous car
because it is safe? If a vehicle can make a utilitarian decision
how should it assess a person’s life value ? Obviously these
situations must be prevented at all costs but in case it is
not possible, car manufacturers are not the ones supposed to
make them. The best option is to get these decisions regulated
by local state agencies. Also, the robot moral principles will
be likely different from the human moral principles [9]. For
most social groups the self-defense premise allows humans
to kill their aggressors but this principle will likely not be
applied to robots.
Moral dilemmas happen when it is not possible to make
a decision without breaking a social norm. But there are
situations where we must break a regulatory law to comply
with social norms and also situations that we must decide
which regulatory law to break. These situations present the
interesting design problem of defining decision priorities.
There is also the problem of fault and liability for traffic
accidents. Initially it may seem like a simple problem to iden-
tify who made wrong decisions that lead to an accident but
there are more variables involved. Since there are different
automation levels a human driver and an autonomous vehicle
may share decisions and therefore responsibilities [27], [28].
Anyway, legal liability and decision-making design are out
of the scope of this work.
A methodology to evaluate decision-making systems must
be independent of the technology and flexible enough to con-
template social groups preferences. But the biggest problem
to evaluate decision-making systems resides in the fact that
it may exist several right decisions. In such conditions it is
typical to look for errors/faults, or specifically, for events
that represent the lack of safety or regulatory compliance.
This approach conforms with constitutional principles such
as “Everything which is not forbidden is allowed”.
IV. EVALUATION PIPELINE
To evaluate an autonomous road vehicle we propose the
use of percept sequences which were defined by Russel
and Norvig [23] as “the complete history of everything the
agent has ever perceived”. But rather than a single and long
percept sequence the evaluation should consist of several
sequences. Each percept sequence is a stream of sensors data
with timestamps.
The perception system would be evaluated by a dataset
created with real sensors data. In this specific evaluation it
is not a requirement that a percept sequence represents task
environments. The most important aspect of this evaluation is
to assess how the perception system deals with the problems
related to the input data from real world sensors.
Differently from the perception system, the decision-
making system must be evaluated over task environments.
Task environments are the ultimate goal of rational agents
i.e. they are the tasks that a rational agent was built to
accomplish. The decision-making evaluation should be made
in a simulator. And since the perception system is previously
evaluated with real sensors data, realistic sensor models and
environments are not strong requirements. What matters is
the complexity of the relationship between the agent behavior
and the environment.
A concern when creating percept sequences is related to
the number of sensors used by a vehicle. In general, a system
reliability scales with the number of sensors. Therefore, for
a fair evaluation the number of sensor and their disposition
on vehicles should be represented in the dataset.
Our main focus is the evaluation of perception and
decision-making systems. To contextualize we propose a
longer evaluation pipeline including the following steps:
1) individual perception subtasks
2) data verisimilitude test
3) decision-making simulation
4) outdoor controlled test
5) autonomous test and deployment
A. Individual Perception Subtasks
This step evaluates the performance of perception subtasks.
It should be done with datasets as it is the current usual
procedure. Datasets are very important for the machine
learning and robotics community. They provide the means
for a fair evaluation between different models. Several ur-
ban roads datasets were created to leverage developments
on autonomous road vehicles [29], [30], [31], [32]. Since
supervised learning algorithms performance scales with the
amount of data, the development of new datasets is always
beneficial.
The usual datasets fulfill their purpose to evaluate mod-
els/algorithms performance, establishing a procedure to com-
pare them. They are also important to train supervised
learning models, although this aspect is not directly evaluated
by datasets. Datasets present high quality data handpicked
and labeled by humans and they fail to model problems that
arise from real world applications.
B. Data Verisimilitude Test
The perception task can be subdivided in several subtasks
like obstacles detection, classification and tracking, traffic
signs detection and road detection. This “divide and conquer”
approach is a valid simplification to solve complex problems.
In autonomous vehicles these subtasks are later integrated in
a module usually called fusion module.
Although the subtasks evaluation are already established
not much attention was given to how the integration module
is evaluated. Since the main idea of using several and dif-
ferent sensors is to provide more reliable results we propose
to evaluate how the fusion module performs facing real data
and problems that can emerge from its use.
With different sensors a fusion module is able to cover a
wider operational range providing a super human ability to
autonomous vehicle. An autonomous vehicle may have a 360-
degree visual field, it may recognize objects at distant ranges
or even in the dark. Besides the usage of different sensors, the
fusion module also make use of sequential data to estimate
future states. Therefore the usage of percept sequences to
evaluate fusion modules seems to be logic.
The data verisimilitude test is a dataset consisting of
several percept sequences. Its evaluation metrics are the same
used in the individual subtasks and its main intention is to
evaluate how the fusion module performs facing the data
problems mentioned in the section III. In other words, the
dataset must contain data representing problems that are usu-
ally found during an autonomous road vehicle deployment.
These problems were separated in 5 groups: data estimation,
data absence, data flux interruption, data corruption and data
attacks.
Data estimation. Since an urban road is a partially observ-
able environment an intelligent agent must be able to estimate
variables. These variables can be partially observable in time
or by different sensors. Some patterns may be present on
parts of percept sequences or some patterns may appear
in only one of the sensors. As examples there are objects
with total occlusion and objects in dark regions detected
only by a LIDAR. Future estimates are extremely important
for decision-making once they predict trajectories and can
anticipate collisions. Since percept sequeces are streams of
sensor data, future states are part of the dataset and can be
used to assess these estimates.
Data absence is represented by data patterns that are
absent on the training set. Since it is impossible to create
a dataset with all objects that may appear in the road, its
main objective is to present a more realistic estimate of the
generalization error. This may be represented by different or
unusual animals, buildings or vehicles. Rare and unusual data
examples could be moved from the training to the testing set
to reproduce this issue. This procedure would cause a data
set imbalance between the training and testing sets. Note this
is different from class imbalance.
Data flux interruption represents a general sensor mal-
function or a sensor communication channel loss. There are
several reasons why a data flux interruption may occur. For
instance a sensor may be broken, its communication channel
or power line may be cut, or a sensor may be blocked by
external objects compromising its normal operation (LIDAR
stuck). This could be reproduced by inconsistent sensors data,
like only zeros/ones.
Data corruption is any data modification caused by signal
interference. Many variables may cause data interference
but we consider only random and unintentional interference.
An interference may occur directly on the digital data or
indirectly on the sensor analog input. It may happen during
data acquisition, processing or transmission. As interference
causes we cite natural interactions with physical quantities
like highly illuminated objects, radiation-absorbent material,
moisture, mud, dirt, sea spray, and etc. It may happen because
weather conditions, by a sensor malfunction or when a sensor
is out of its operational range. It also may occur by radio
frequency interference and electrical discharges originated
externally or from other devices installed on vehicle.
Data attacks (sensor or remote attacks) are input data
manipulated by external agents with the intention to cause
errors. Some papers [33], [34] partially address the issue
showing it is possible to remotely manipulate cameras and
LIDAR input data. However, they do not evaluate the per-
ception algorithms that process the input data. For instance
Petit et al. [33] generates attacks that degrade the sensors
data quality while Shin et al. [34] is able to induce fake dots
and saturate a LIDAR sensor. These works directly attack
sensors corrupting input data but it is also possible to do it
indirectly, generating data patterns that can fool perception
algorithms.
In computer vision these modified images are denominated
adversarial examples and the manipulated information is de-
nominated perturbations [35], [36]. These attacks are carried
by adding perturbations in data patterns that are detected
by a perception system. Several recent researches provide
evidences that real world perturbations can be designed to
deceive perception models [37], [38], [39]. This is one of the
most critical problems since current solutions are extremely
limited and do not present definitive solutions [40], [41].
C. Decision Making Simulation
For a thorough assessment of autonomous vehicles per-
formance the decision-making system must be considered.
The perception system will never be perfect but the decision-
making system must able to define countermeasures to partial
or defective information, as noted by Okumura et al. [5].
For instance, a solution could be implemented to check if a
sensor is working under its operational range and otherwise
the autonomous vehicle should perform a controlled stop.
The decision-making system should also be evaluated with
percept sequences. But differently from the perception system
the percept sequences must represent task environments. This
is an approach similar to Huang et al. [3] however the model
based evaluation should be replaced by a constraint based
evaluation, where each task must be executed within time-
space-interaction restrictions (or environment state). This
change would allow a fair evaluation of solutions with
different base models. For instance, a car that parks itself
within 1 minute in the limited parking area without hitting
anything must be consider a valid solution.
A task evaluation satisfies the Russel and Norvig statement
[23]: “As a general rule, it is better to design performance
measures according to what one actually wants in the envi-
ronment, rather than according to how one thinks the agent
should behave”.
This decision-making evaluation is not able to rank solu-
tions. Its main purpose is to reprove solutions that are not
able to comply with the given task. Therefore it is a binary
decision-making evaluation where the vehicle is free to take
any action as long as it do not cause any harm and they
respect the traffic laws. It is a binary evaluation because the
vehicle automatically fails if it does not comply with the rules
and it actually assess the lack of safety.
It is interesting to note that a real urban road is an
extremely dynamic environment and a real time measurement
of all relevant variables is impractical. Given the complexity
of the task the only feasible solution is to evaluate the
decision-making system through computer simulations. But
as Russel and Norvig [23] states: “In fact, what matters is not
the distinction between real and artificial environments, but
the complexity of the relationship among the behavior of the
agent, the percept sequence generated by the environment,
and the performance measure”.
Since perception systems are highly data dependent cer-
tainly Russel and Norvig were addressing high level func-
tionalities such as decision-making. And when the perception
system is previously tested with real sensor data the dis-
tinction between the real and artificial environment becomes
irrelevant for a decision-making system evaluation. What is
important to attend is the performance level of the simulated
sensors that must be similar to that observed in the data
verisimilitude test.
In summary a simulation is the best choice for decision-
making assessment because it can evaluate the lack of safety
without causing real damage. It is able to manage the high
number of agents and the complex interaction among them.
And also it gives a concrete sense of the consequences of
each action.
D. Outdoor Controlled Tests
These tests are similar to the simulated decision-making
evaluation but the simulation is replaced by a mock-up test
field with traffic signs and obstacles. This evaluation is also
task driven and the vehicle must respect all restrictions and
traffic laws. Their main purpose is to validate the subsystem
integration.
E. Autonomous Test and Deployment
It is impossible to predict every single situation an au-
tonomous car can face. The occurrence of rare situations is
one of the reasons that road field tests are so important.
Initially a vehicle should be tested in real urban roads
without implementing the action layer. The autonomous
test step requires human drivers to move around while the
autonomous system runs in background without controlling
the actuators. Its main purpose is to use the software logs
to find events that could be harmful or that are against the
traffic laws.
If a vehicle is able to comply with all these steps it should
be safe enough to be deployed in urban roads to start real
autonomous tests.
V. CONCLUSION
Evaluating an autonomous car system is a very complex
problem that should be done from many scientific perspec-
tives like engineering, computer science, psychology and law.
Although car manufacturers wish to quickly develop self-
driving cars their ambitions must not come before safety mea-
sures. We have proposed an evaluation model for autonomous
road intelligent agents based in percept sequences. We have
also identified critical aspects as the data dependency from
perception models and also the critical points that must be
addressed when designing decision making systems. Since
this work focus on perception and decision-making systems
it is not meant to become the single procedure to assess
an autonomous car performance. We hope this paper can
instigate further discussion about the topic.
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